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CASE NOTES
quately protects a parent's discretion in child rearing while it provides a
child with a right of action for injuries caused by negligent parental con-
duct. Each case involving intrafamily parties can be evaluated on its
merits rather than on formal characteristics that dispose of the action
without regard to the negligent control of the parent.
Workers' Compensation-EMPLOYEE REIMBURSEMENT TO EMPLOYER
AND EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION TO THIRD PARTIES-IKordosky v. Conway
Fire &Safey, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1981).
Recent workers' compensation decisions by the Minnesota Supreme
Court have substantially changed the allocation of loss between employ-
ers and third parties.I These changes evidence tension between the vari-
ous purposes of the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act,2 particularly
between the objectives of limited employer liability and equitable alloca-
mune from liability, the non-parent defendant would be liable for all damages. See
Ourada v. Knahmuhs, 301 Minn. 131, 221 N.W.2d 659 (1974). In Ourada the father
brought an action individually and as natural guardian of his son who had fallen from an
improperly maintained stairway in a house which the parents were renting. The jury
found defendant lessor 70% negligent, and the father 30% negligent. The trial court or-
dered judgment for the child against defendant in the amount of $2,000, for the father
against the defendant in the amount of $280 (deducting 30% from the $400 award), and
for the defendant against the father in the amount of $600 (30% of the $2,000 award). On
appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the father's conduct involved an exercise
of ordinary parental discretion with respect to housing. Therefore, the father was not
liable for any injury to his son and the trial court erred in reducing the award recovered
against lessor by the amount of the father's negligence.
1. See Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Liability on Minnesota: Pn'nciples of Loss Alloca-
tion, 6 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 243, 287-326 (1980); Note, Contribution and Indemnit-An
Eamination of the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Loss Allocation Concepts, 5 WM. MrrCHELL L.
REV. 109, 114 (1979); Note, The Third Party's Dilemma-Ntghgence, and the Minnesota Work-
men's Compensation Act, 1 WM. MrCHELL L. REV. 134, 135 (1974).
2. MINN. STAT. ch. 176 (1980). The Minnesota Supreme Court first discussed the
multiple policies supporting workers' compensation law when it upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act in Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 126
Minn. 286, 148 N.W. 71 (1914). The court deferred to the policies underlying the act in
the following language:
We shall not stop to discuss the shortcoming and unsatisfactory results of
the law of negligence as applied to present-day industrial conditions; nor the
desirability of providing more certain, effective and inexpensive relief for injured
workmen than the present common-law actions afford; nor the economic reasons
for imposing upon an employer, not because he is at fault, but as a burden inci-
dent to his business, the obligation to contribute to the support of employees
disabled through injuries received in the course of their employment. Much
consideration has been given to these questions by publicists and students of
industrial, economic, and social problems; and it has become generally recog-
nized that the common law fails to make adequate or equitable provision for the
economic loss resulting from a disability which deprives the workman of his
earning power.
Id at 288-89, 148 N.W. at 72.
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tion of loss among responsible defendants. 3 Under Minnesota law in-
jured employees who have received or are entitled to receive workers'
compensation benefits from their employers4 may also bring tort actions
3. The equitable direction pursued by the court has been to increase the plaintiff's
recovery and raise the resulting burden on the employer. As the Eighth Circuit observed
of the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act:
The purpose of the legislation [as adopted in 1913] was to provide more certain,
effective, speedy, and inexpensive relief for injured workmen than was afforded
by the common-law rules of negligence, and measurably to place upon industry
the burden of economic loss resulting from the deaths and injuries of workmen
engaged in industry.
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Frechette, 161 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1947). While the
increased burden is nominally placed on industry, it does not necessarily rest there. As
Professor Larson has noted, "In compensation theory, liability is not supposed to hurt the
employer as it helps the employee, since the loss is normally passed on the consumer." 1
A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.70, at 13 (1978). Further-
more, the employer's general liability costs are also supposed to be reduced by inherent
economic advantages of workers' compensation allocation of loss, as opposed to tort allo-
cation of loss. ee G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF AccIDENTs 245-46 (1970). Simply stated,
the overall costs of compensating employee injuries are reduced when losses are imposed
on employers without regard to fault since employers rather than employees are better
able to estimate accurately the costs of injuries and are in a better position to promote
worker safety in order to reduce workers' compensation costs. The transaction costs of
providing the allocation is lowered by bypassing the expensive litigation process. Id at
252. Arguably, this promotes economic justice for the employee with any savings being
passed on to the consumer.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the remedial nature of the
workers' compensation statute, see, e.g., Lamberton v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114,
121, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (1977); Umbreit v. Quality Tool, Inc., 302 Minn. 376, 378, 225
N.W.2d 10, 12 (1975), and has generally construed its provisions liberally in favor of
claimants. Set Harrison v. Schafer Constr. Co., 257 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Minn. 1977) ("[In
view of the remedial and humanitarian purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act, its
provisions are to be given a broad liberal construction in favor of the interests of the
claimant"). Unfortunately, this remedial policy has created conflicts with the objective of
limited employer liability. See general# Larson, The Wage-Loss Jniple In Workers' Compen-
sation, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 501 (1980). After examining Minnesota's liberal com-
pensation scheme, Professor Larson concluded:
[A]s suggested at the outset, the working out of Minnesota's extreme physical-
impairment approach can also be watched. Here the signs are less encouraging.
In 1974, when Minnesota avowedly adopted the physical-impairment theory by
legislative amendment, its average manual rate was $1.65--ranking twenty-first
in the country. By 1978, it had risen to $2.83, placing it fourteenth in rank. The
rate of litigation in Minnesota is also very high--twenty times that of South
Dakota and two and one half times that of Wisconsin. The Minnesota Study
Commission singled out disability evaluation as a significant factor in producing
this rate. It may be only a matter of time until Minnesota finds itself approach-
ing the situation Florida faced in 1978-with a $5.30 manual rate, and with
seventy-nine percent of litigation time consumed by disability evaluation
controversy.
Id at 532 (footnotes omitted).
4. E g., MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1980). "The liability of an employer prescribed by
this chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other liability to such employee, his per-
sonal representative, surviving spouse, parent, any child, dependent, next of kin, or other
person entitled to recover damages on account of such injury or death." Id Despite the
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against third parties.5 Before 1976 an employee who obtained a tort
judgment against a third-party tortfeasor had to reimburse his employer
for the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid for his injury.6
clarity of this language the Minnesota Supreme Court has construed the statute as not
governing the liability between cotortfeasors such as an employer and a third party. See
Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 379, 201 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1972).
The court in Haney observed that it had "long held that the Workmen's Compensation
Act is intended to control only the rights between employer and employee and does not by
its terms prevent contribution or indemnity where appropriate." Id at 379, 201 N.W.2d
at 143 (quoting Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370, 104
N.W.2d 834, 836 (1960)).
Illustrative of the conflict between the equitable remedy of contribution and the stat-
utory exclusivity of workers' compensation liability is the dissenting opinion in Westches-
ter Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567
(1938):
The Legislature enacted the Workmen's Compensation Law . . . and provided
that the liability of the employer "shall be exclusive and in the place of any other
liability whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representatives, husband,
parents, dependents or next of kind, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages, at
common law or otherwire on account of such injury or death. .. ."
I can only interpret this constitutional provision [authorizing the statute]
and the law enacted under it so as to limit the employer's liability as well as the
employee's recovery. The employer, for an accident causing death to an em-
ployee, is liable for the amounts stated in the Compensation Law, and is not
liable beyond that to any one upon any cause of action arising out of the death.
What has been done below in this case is a violation of this statute under the
constitutional provision, for it makes the employer liable indirectly in an amount
which could not be recovered directly. The employee or the representatives for
this accident had no cause of action against the employer; the remedy was solely
under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and for the amounts stated therein.
This conceded. Yet because a third party paid the employee's representative it is
permitted to recover the payment from the employer. In other words, the repre-
sentatives receive a large sum of money through a negligence action from the
employer merely because the money passes through the hands of a third party;
and yet all concede that the employer is not liable to the representatives. To me
this is mere sophistry.
I do claim, however, that the third party, if entitled to recover against the
employer upon any principle of recoupment, should be limited to the amount
that the employer would be obliged to pay to the representatives under the
Workmen's Compensation Law.
Id at 184-85, 15 N.E.2d at 570-71 (Crane, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
5. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(5) (1980); see Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn.
114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). In Larmbertson the court explained that "[d]espite its essential
nonfault character, the workers' compensation system retains an important common-law
aspect--the third-party action." Id at 121, 257 N.W.2d at 684. The court perceived
equity in preservation of the third party suit option of an employee.
Such an action accomplishes two beneficial results for the workers' compensation
system: (1) The at-fault third party is made to reimburse the employer who has
been forced to bear the costs of the third party's activity; and (2) the employee
obtains a full common-law recovery against the third party, who is not subject to
the benefits and burdens of the workers' compensation system.
Id at 121, 257 N.W.2d at 684-85.
6. See Act of Apr. 25, 1969, ch. 199, 1969 Minn. Laws 307, 309 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6) (Supp. 1981)). The pre-1976 statute stated:
The proceeds of all actions for damages or settlement thereof under section
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The third-party tortfeasor had no right of contribution from the em-
ployer at that time.7
To correct what was felt to be an inequitable distribution of the tort
judgment,8 a 1976 amendment to the workers' compensation statute re-
quired employers to share proportionately with employees in the fees and
expenses incurred by the employee in obtaining the recovery from the
176.06, received by the injured employee or his dependents or by the employer as
provided by subdivision 5, shall be divided as follows:
(a) After deducting the reasonable costs of collection including but not limited
to attorneys' fees and burial expense in excess of the liability, then
(b) One-third of the remainder shall in any event be paid to the injured em-
ployee or his dependents, without being subject to any right of subrogation.
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer shall be reimbursed for all
compensation paid under Minnesota Statute, chapter 176.
(d) Any balance remaining shall be paid to the employee or his dependents
and shall be a credit to employer for any compensation which employer is obli-
gated to pay, but has not been paid, and for any compensation that such em-
ployer shall be obligated to make in the future.
Id
7. At one point, in 1969, the Minnesota legislature had enacted a statute which pro-
scribed a third party from seeking even the limited common-law right of indemnity from a
negligent employer. See Act of June 4, 1969, ch. 936, § 4, 1969 Minn. Laws 1804, 1806
(repealed 1976). This statute provided:
If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the employee, the em-
ployer, or both jointly against the third person, results in judgment against such
third person, or settlement by such third person, the employer shall have no
liability to reimburse to hold such third person harmless on such judgments or
settlements in absence of a written agreement to do so executed prior to the
injury.
This statute was declared unconstitutional in 1974, see Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn.
362, 216 N.W.2d 615 (1974) (deprivation of third party tortfeasor's common-law right of
indemnity without adequate substitute violation of due process), and was repealed by the
legislature in 1976.
Prior to the enactment of the above section, indemnification had been held by the
court to be proper in the following situations:
(1) Where the one seeking indemnity [had] only a derivative or vicarious liabil-
ity for damage caused by the one sought to be charged.
(2) Where the one seeking indemnity [had] incurred liability by action at the
direction, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be charged.
(3) Where the one seeking indemnity [had] incurred liability because of a
breach of duty owed to him by the one sought to be charged.
(4) Where the one seeking indemnity [had] incurred liability merely because of
failure, even though negligent, to discover or prevent the misconduct of the one
sought to be charged.
(5) Where there [was] an express contract between the parties containing an
explicit undertaking to reimburse for liability of the character involved.
Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 372-73, 104 N.W.2d 843,
848 (1960).
8. The inequity lay in the employee's burden of paying all costs and fees to recover
the third-party award only to have the employer enjoy the fruits of the recovery through
reimbursement of its workers' compensation liability free of any litigation expense. See
Steenson, supra note 1, at 293.
[Vol. 8
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third-party tortfeasor.9 The employer's share of the recovery costs was to
be deducted from the reimbursement otherwise received from the em-
ployee. The employer was therefore reimbursed less than the total
amount of its workers' compensation liability to the employee and the
employee retained a larger amount of the third-party tort recovery.
With the 1977 decision of Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp. 10 the equity of
the amended reimbursement scheme was undermined. The Lambertson
rule, as explained by the Minnesota court in Johnson v. Raske Building Sys-
tems, Inc. ," allows third-party tortfeasors contribution from negligent
employers up to the lesser of the employer's workers' compensation liabil-
ity or percentage of comparative negligence.12 This limited contribution
was the Minnesota Supreme Court's response to the plight of third-party
tortfeasors who often found themselves paying personal injury awards to
employees far in excess of their comparative fault. 13 In the face of statu-
tory language holding employers exclusively liable to injured employ-
ees, 14 the Lamberson court held that equity demanded some measure of
contribution from negligent employers to third parties despite the ab-
sence of "common liability" to injured employees.15
Considered separately, the 1976 reimbursement amendment and the
Lambertson rule each respects the fundamental workers' compensation
principle of limited employer liability. By itself, the 1976 amendment
has no effect on the employer's maximum workers' compensation liabil-
ity; it merely reduces the employer's reimbursement from the employee.
Likewise Lambertson alone allows third-party tortfeasors contribution
from the employer only up to the maximum of the employer's workers'
compensation liability. However, when the 1976 amendment and Lam-
bertson work together, a negligent employer is reimbursed less than the
full amount of its workers' compensation liability while it has to pay con-
tribution up to the full amount of its workers' compensation liability.
16
9. Act of Apr. 3, 1976, ch. 154, § 2, 1976 Minn. Laws 449, 449-50 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6)(c) (Supp. 1981)). The 1976 amendment read as follows:
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer shall be reimbursed in an
amount equal to all compensation paid under chapter 176 to the employee or his
dependents by the employer less the product of the costs deducted under clause
(a) divided by the total proceeds received by the employee or his dependents from the other
party multiplied by all compensation paid by the employer to the employee or his dependents.
Id (emphasis added).
The transaction is popularly said to "wash out," leaving the employer's net liability
the same as before the contribution was required.
10. 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
11. 276 N.W.2d 79,81 & n.5 (Minn. 1979).
12. Id. at 130, 257 N.W.2d at 689. The Minnesota comparative negligence statute
became a comparative fault statute in 1978. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978
Minn. Laws 839.
13. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d at 684.
14. MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1980).
15. See Lambertson, 257 N.W.2d at 687, 689.
16. See infra note 32.
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Thus, in a case where the percentage of the employer's fault is equal to or
exceeds the employer's workers' compensation liability, the employer will
contribute more to the third-party tortfeasor than it will receive from the
employee in reimbursement. The end result is that the employer pays
out more than its statutory limit of liability and may even pay out more
than its percentage of comparative fault.1
7
The Minnesota Supreme Court had an opportunity to examine the
imbalance created by the combination of the 1976 amendment and the
Lambertson rule in Kordosky v. Conway Fire & Safiety, Inc. 18 The plaintiff in
Kordosky was injured while employed at a supermarket when a fire extin-
guisher, improperly mounted on a wall, fell and struck her as she was
kneeling to stock cigarettes. 19 As a result of the accident, plaintiff col-
lected substantial workers' compensation benefits. 20
Plaintiff and her spouse brought suit against the manufacturer and
installer of the fire extinguisher, Conway Fire and Safety, Inc. Conway
impleaded the employer, Red Owl Store's Inc., as a third-party defend-
ant.2 1 The jury awarded damages of $60,000 to the plaintiff,2 2 finding
Red Owl sixty percent negligent and Conway forty percent negligent.23
17. See infra note 24.
18. 304 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1981).
19. Id at 617. The evidence of two expert witnesses proved, without dispute, that the
fire extinguisher had been improperly mounted on the wall. A significant dispute arose
over who had done the installation. This question was not specifically answered by the
jury as the special verdict form did not call for it. This omission may have been costly to
the employer, as it appeared from a fair preponderance of the evidence that Conway Fire
& Safety, Inc. was the installer. Set Appeal Brief of Red Owl Stores, Inc., at 3-4, Respon-
dent's Brief at 1, Kordosky v. Conway Fire & Safety, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1981)
(both employer and employee contended that Conway was installer and that documenta-
tion such as Conway's bill for installation supported that contention).
20. "At the time of trial, the employer had paid $21,947.69 in workers' compensation
benefits." 304 N.W.2d at 618.
21. Conway asserted that the employer was a necessary and proper party based on
two allegations: First, that the employer had done the actual installation (despite the fact
that Conway had billed the employer for the installation); and secondly, regardless of the
identity of the installer, the employer was at least liable for its passive negligence in failing
to correct the deficient installation after the weakness of the moorings become obvious. See
id at 617.
22. See id Plaintiff's spouse was awarded $10,000 for his loss of consortium. The total
award of $70,000 was apportioned between the employer and the third party despite the
fact that the spouse of an employee for loss of consortium. See Hartman v. Cold Spring
Granite Co., 247 Minn. 515, 77 N.W.2d 651 (1956); see also Rescop v. Nationwide Carri-
ers, 281 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1979). The Kordosky court noted this inconsistency but let it
stand since the respondent had not raised the issue. See 304 N.W.2d at 620 n. I.
23. See 304 N.W.2d at 617. The allocation of fault by the jury is perhaps questiona-
ble. The trial court record suggests that Red Owl was only passively negligent, and that
the danger was not created by its negligence in failing to inspect or maintain. The
Kordosky court observed:
Respondent Kordosky argues that Red Owl's admission that it failed to inspect
the fire extinguisher installation was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Re-
spondent Conway Fire and Safety, Inc., argues that the evidence was sufficient
[Vol. 8
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The trial court ordered that the award be apportioned according to both
the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act and the Lambertson rule on
contribution. The order made the employer liable to the defendant for
its sixty percent share of negligence up to the limit of the workers' com-
pensation benefits already paid to the plaintiff. Then, applying the
amendment, the trial court allowed the employer reimbursement for its
workers' compensation liability, less its proportionate share of the em-
ployee's fees and costs. The net effect of this procedure was to make Red
Owl pay out more than its statutory workers' compensation liability.24
to support the jury's conclusion that Red Owl failed to maintain the fire extin-
guisher installation. This argument is based on the fact that Kordosky only
brushed the extinguisher and this was sufficient to cause it to fall on her. Con-
way argues that the jury must have concluded the extinguisher was hanging by a
thread and that Red Owl should have discovered this situation.
Id at 618.
24. The Kordosky court affirmed the trial court's application of the 1976 reimburse-
ment formula and demonstrated the difference between this result and a pre-1976 break-
down based on the Krdosky facts:
Pre-1976 Amendment
Total Recovery $70,000.00
Less 1/3 attorney's fee 23,333.33
46,666.67
Less 1/3 to plaintiff 15,555.55
31,111.12
Less reimbursement of 21,947.69 in workers' compensation
benefits paid by Red Owl 21,947.69
Balance to plaintiff 9,163.43
Post-1976 Amendment
Total Recovery 70,000.00
Less 1/3 attorney's fee 23,333.33
46,666.67
Less 1/3 to plaintiff 15,555.55
31,111.12
Less reimbursement of 21,947.69 in workers' compensation
benefits paid by Red Owl reduced by a proportionate
attorney's fee
Formula by statute:
Fees × Benefits paid -
Total Recovery
23,333.33 x 21,947.69 =
70,000.00
.3331 x 21,947.69 =
7,315.89
Benefits minus proportionate fee 21,947.69 - 7,315.89 14,631.80
16,479.32
Balance to plaintiff 16,479.32
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On appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the order of judg-
ment. The court held that the trial court had properly allocated the
award as required by the amended statute despite the recognized imbal-
ance produced by the employer's statutory right to less-than-full reim-
bursement from the employee and the employer's judicially-required
contribution to the third party. 25 The Minnesota Supreme Court had
upheld the validity of the reimbursement amendment in the 1979 case of
Id at 620 (footnote omitted).
The amended statute increases the employee's recovery and reduces the employer's
reimbursement by $7,315.89. Conway, whose comparative fault made it liable for $28,000
(40% of $70,000), paid $70,000 to the plaintiffs and recovered $21,947.69 in contribution
from Red Owl for a net liability of $48.052.31 ($70,000 - $21,947.69) or 69% of $70,000.
Red Owl, whose comparative fault came to $42,000 (60% of $70,000), paid $21,947.69 in
workers' compensation benefits to the plaintiff, recovered $14,631.80 of this amount in
reimbursement from the plaintiff, and then paid $21,947.60 to Conway in contribution for
a total liability of $29,2163.58 ($21.947.69 + (21.947.69 - $14,631.80)). Thus Conway, the
40%-at-fault third party, pays 69% of the tort award and Red Owl, the 60%-at-fault em-
ployer, pays only 31% ($21,947.69/$70,000.00) of the tort award but pays out money in
excess of its workers' compensation liability.
The Kordosky court undoubtedly was influenced by the fact that Conway paid
$20,052.31 in excess of its comparative fault whereas Red Owl paid only $7,315.89 in
excess of its statutory liability. Moreover, Red Owl's total loss of $29,263.58 was still
$12,736.42 less than its comparative fault of $42,000.
A slight change in the Kordosky facts probably would have resulted in a different
decision. If the percentages of fault are reversed, but all other facts remain the same, Red
Owl would have paid damages in excess of its comparative fault and in excess of its statu-
tory liability. Assuming Conway was 60% at fault and Red Owl was 40%, Conway's com-
parative fault liability would have been $42,000 (60% of $70,000) and Red Owl's would
have been $28,000 (40% of $70,000). Red Owl's workers' compensation liability and reim-
bursement remain the same: Red Owl pays $21,947.69 in compensation benefits to the
plaintiff and receives $14,631.80 in reimbursement under the 1976 amendment. Red Owl
would then pay $21,947.69, the lesser of its workers' compensation liability or comparative
fault, to Conway in contribution. The result here is that Conway, the 60%-at-fault third
party, pays $48,052.31 ($70,000.00 - $21,947.69) or 69% of the tort award. Red Owl pays
a total of $29,263.58 ($21.947.69 + $7,315.89), this figure is $7,315.89 in excess of Red
Owl's workers' compensation liability and $1,2163.58 in excess of its comparative fault
liability.
25. 304 N.W.2d at 620. The court in Kordosky noted that
[t]he 1976 amendment operates to increase the amount of the proceeds the plain-
tiff is entitled to keep. Since the formula requires the employer to pay the full
amount of workers' compensation benefits to the third party as a form of limited
contribution, the employer loses money in the exchange.
Id
The court has affirmed the statutory deduction of reimbursement in two recent cases
where no employer contribution was involved. See Kealy v. St. Paul, Hous. & Redev.
Auth., 303 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1981); Cronen v. Weghdahl Coop. Elevator Ass'n, 278
N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 1979). In Johnson v. Raske Bldg. Systems, Inc., 276 N.W.2d 79, 81
n.5 (Minn. 1979), the court acknowledged the potential for contribution in excess of reim-
bursement and acquiesced in that result: "In future cases the amount of reimbursement
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Cronen v. Wegdahl Cooperative Elevator Association. 26 The Cronen court stated
that the purpose of the 1976 amendment was "to ensure that those
benefitted by the recovery share equitably in the cost of obtaining that
recovery." 27 Like the Cronen decision, Kordosky relies heavily on the prin-
ciple that beneficiaries of a recovery must share in its costs. The Cronen
court had pointed to the statutory provision28 that makes the excess bal-
ance, which plaintiff retains after reimbursement to the employer, a fu-
ture credit for the employer against additional workers' compensation
claims by the employee.29 The Kordosky court may have believed that
any short-term advantage enjoyed by the third-party tortfeasor at the
expense of the employer was offset by the long-term benefits afforded to
the employer by the future credit rule.
In apportioning the award, the Kordosky court followed the formula for
Lambertson contribution prescribed earlier in Johnson v. Raske Building Sys-
tens, Inc. 30 Although the Kordosky court contended that its holdings in
Johnson and Kordosky were mandated by statute, the court considered
those decisions to be an expression of the most equitable application of
the statute.
3'
The employer in Kordosky had proposed a modification of the em-
ployer's maximum workers' compensation liability. 32 This proposal
26. 278 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 1979).
27. Id at 104.
28. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6)(d) (1980).
29. See 278 N.W.2d at 105. The court based the credit on total liability, reasoning
that this is appropriate where the employer faces its fair share of the employee's attorney's
fees. The court defended the total liability basis because "ft]o hold otherwise would en-
courage claimants to delay settlement until virtually all workers' compensation benefits
had been paid." Id at 105. Such delay is not equitable to any of the parties, or the system
as a whole, since it exacerbates the system's delay and expense.
30. 276 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1979).
31. 304 N.W.2d at 621. "[While t]he results in this case do not fully achieve the
equitable goals that form the underpinnings ofLambertson . ..as we noted in johnson, the
result will not be perfect in every case." Id To the extent there is a harsh result in
Kordosky, the court implies that it is the legislature's product, not the court's. This is illus-
trated by the court's conclusion that "even if this court desired to change this aspect of the
distribution formula, it could not since the reduction of a proportionate attorney's fee is
mandated by the 1976 amendment." d
32. See Appeal Brief of Red Owl Stores, Inc., at 16, Kordosky v. Conway Fire &
Safety, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1981). The proposal said that:
(1) In the event a judgment is rendered in a third party action and it is found
that the proportionate share of the employer's negligence results in employer
liability for more than its Workers' Compensation liability, then the employee is
not entitled to any reimbursement of its subrogation claims for Workers' Com-
pensation benefits paid. The third party tortfeasor is then entitled to a set off on
the judgment rendered in favor of the employee in the amount equal to the sum
of workers' compensation benefits paid and the present value of compensation
benefits payable in the future. The balance of the judgment is then given to the
employee and his attorney with no right of reimbursement by the employer.
(2) In the case where the employer's proportionate share of negligence is found
to be less than its Workers' Compensation liability, then the proportionate
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would have limited the employer's total liability to the employer's maxi-
mum liability under the workers' compensation statute.33 The supreme
court rejected the employer's proposal stating that such a change re-
quired statutory revision and consequently exceeded the court's
authority.
34
The court also considered the proposal of Professor Steenson. This
simpler proposal altered the Johnson formula so that the employer paid or
contributed to the third party only that amount which the employer re-
covered from the employee as reimbursement.35 The court conceded
that Professor Steenson's solution was practical but disagreed that it was
more in line with Lamberison than its own interpretation. In the court's
view, Lambertson r principal objective was to ameliorate the situation of
third-party tortfeasors.36 Professor Steenson's approach would have fur-
amount of compensation representing the employer's negligence is set off from
the jury award. The negligent third party tortfeasor pays the balance of the jury
verdict to the employee. The employer is allowed reimbursement only after the
attorney's fees and the employee's share has been deducted and then only in an
amount equal to its Workers' Compensation benefits less the amount used as set-
off by the third party tortfeasor. The employer would pay attorney's fees pursu-
ant to Minn. Stat. § 176.061, Subd. 6(c) for the amount of reimbursement of
Workers' Compensation actually received.
Id at 16-17 (footnote omitted). Although unwieldy, this formula is no more complex than
thedohnson formula the court actually employed in Kordosky. Compare supra note 24 with
tnhfa note 36.
33. The appellant claimed several advantages to its proposal:
Note that the application of this simpler formula would yield the same result as
advocated by this Court inJohnson v. Raske. That is, no money would change
hands in the form of reimbursement or contribution. The advantages of this
formula are that it is not as cumbersome as theJohnson formula in that it would
not require a circuitous exchange of money between the parties. Also, it would
result in the absurdity of an employer paying attorney's fees pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 176.061, Subd. 6(c), for reimbursement which it never actually receives.
Appeal Brief of Red Owl Stores, Inc., at 16 n.6, Kordosky v. Conway Fire &
Safety, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1981).
34. See 304 N.W.2d at 621. The court reasoned that "[tJhe implementation of this
system would require extensive amendments to Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subd. 6 (1980), and
is therefore beyond the power of this court." Id
35. According to Professor Steenson, limiting employer contribution to the reim-
bursement right
would ensure that the basic workers' compensation insurance "bargain" would
not be disrupted, yet it would limit the right of the employer to obtain reim-
bursement for workers' compensation benefits paid to the injured employee.
The suggested approach seems most consistent with the apparent intent of the
court in Lamberlson to do the least violence possible to the statute, while allowing
a limited form of contribution by the third party against the employer.
Steenson, supra note 1, at 306.
36. See 304 N.W.2d at 621. Professor Steenson focused on preserving the result in
Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). &e Steenson,
supra note 1, at 306. Employers view limited liability as part of the contractual right
under the workers' compensation statute wherein an agreement has been struck between
employer and employee. In exchange for fixed, predictable limits on employer liability,
the employee receives the certainty of compensation.' Id at 287-89. Professor Steenson
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ther reduced the already limited contribution available from negligent
employers and would also have had the effect of passing the employer's
proportionate share of the employee's recovery costs along to the third
party.
3 7
argues that tipping the scales in favor of the third party as opposed to the employer does
not appear to be analytically justifiable:
If there is no difficulty in creating a new liability for the employer in situations in
which the employer's reimbursement does not equal the workers' compensation
benefits paid because of the employer's obligation to pay a portion of the plain-
tiff's attorneys' fees and expenses, there should be no problem in extending the
third party's right of contribution to the employer's credit. In principle, it is
difficult to distinguish the two situations from a policy perspective.
Steenson, supra note 1, at 302.
TheJohnson formula allows for the possibility of a case in which the employer's net
liability will exceed its share of comparative fault. See supra note 24. The appellant noted
this prospect and constructed a hypothetical to illustrate it:
Assume these facts: The employer has paid $60,000 in Workers' Compensation
benefits. The employee brings a suit against a third party manufacturer of the
product which caused or contributed to his work-related injury. The third-party
manufacturer impleads the employer for contribution. The jury returns a ver-
dict, finding the employer 80% negligent and the third party tortfeasor 20% neg-
ligent. The mechanical application of the Johnson formula produces the
following computations:
(1) Judgment for plaintiff, which is paid in full by the third party tortfeasor.
$99,999 of this amount, the employer contributes to the third party tortfeasor an
amount proportionate to its percentage share of negligence, but not to exceed the
amount of Workers' Compensation benefits payable to the employees. In this
case, then the employer would contribute $60,000 to the third-party tortfeasor in
addition to its $60,000 which it has already paid to the employee as Workers'
Compensation. At this point in the application of the formula, then, the em-
ployer's total liability and payment is $120,000 or $60,000 above and beyond its
Workers' Compensation h'abiliy.
(2) Minus reasonable cost of collection pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 176.061, Subd. 6(a) [attorney's fees of 33.5 percent] $33,333
$66,666
(3) Minus one-third directly to plaintiff with no right of
subrogation pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.061, Subd. 6(b) $22,222
$44,444
(4) Minus all compensation paid under Chapter 176 pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 176.061, Subd. 6(c) or $44,444 less attorney's fees of
$14,814 $29,630
(5) Balance to plaintiff pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.061, Subd.
6(d). $14,814
The mechanical application of the Johnson formula to the fact situation in
this example will result in the employer having to pay $30,370 in excess of its
Workers' Compensation liability for a total liability of $90,370.
Surely, this absurd result, which is directly contrary to the Court's well-
reasoned and policy-based decision in Lambertson was never intended by this
Court and certainly not by the legislature!
Appeal Brief of Red Owl Stores, Inc., at 12-13, Kordosky v. Conway Fire & Safety, Inc.,
304 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1981) (footnotes omitted). The hypotheticals which produce
these questionable results in the application of the Johnson formula are by no means
strained or extreme. For other examples, see Steenson, supra note 1, at 292-95.
37. As the Kordoskly court stated, "[T]o pass this reduction on to the third party would
be to require the third party to pay for the privilege of being sued." Id
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A general concern not addressed by the Kordosky court is the workers'
compensation system's possible inability to absorb increased liability
costs.38 The sudden increase in the cost of workers' compensation insur-
ance experienced in other states that have liberalized their workers' com-
pensation statutes should provide strong warning to both courts and
legislatures acting in this area.39 Liability in excess of statutory limits
38. There is some danger that the court's search for equity in this area of workers'
compensation-third-party law will exacerbate the system's inability to reduce the costs of
loss allocation. As the United States Commerce Department has observed:
[I]f full contribution or indemnity by the product manufacturer against the em-
ployer is permitted, the employer may be forced to pay an employee--through
the conduit of the third-party tortfeasor-an amount in excess of the employer's
statutory Worker Compensation liability. This thwarts a central concept behind
Worker Compensation, ie., that the employer and employee received the bene-
fits of a guaranteed, fixed-schedule, no fault recovery system, which constitutes
the exclusive liability of the employer. The approach also increases transaction
costs.
UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILrrY AcT § 114, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,740 (1979) (emphasis
in original). The Department of Commerce discussed the relationship between product
liability and workers' compensation noting the result in Lambertron.
Minnesota has experienced a serious increase in workers' compensation costs. The
Minnesota Workers' Compensation Study Commission noted that
[t]he adoption of the essential recommendation [made by the National Commis-
sion on State Workermen's Compensation Laws of O.S.H.A.] and increased ben-
efits were expected to result in increased costs. However, little indication was
given that costs would escalate so rapidly. In 1970 direct written premiums in
Minnesota were under $80 million. By 1980 this figure had escalated over 500
percent to exceed $400 million.
This dramatic increase in workers' compensation costs far exceeds the
amount predicted by the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Rating Association
(Bureau) when the benefit improvement bills were being considered by the Leg-
islature. Having attained adequate benefit levels, the concern of recent legisla-
tive sessions has been how to deal with unanticipated increases in costs now
facing Minnesota employers.
MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION, A REPORT TO THE MIN-
NESOTA LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR 13 (1980).
39. See generally Parrish, Workmen's Compensation Law hn Illinoir: Some Economic Conse-
quences ofRecent CHanges, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 715 (1978). Professor Parrish, an economist,
first observed that the extreme liberalization of benefits in workers' compensation law in
Illinois in 1975 sent such costs soaring for Illinois employers. Secondly, he noted that the
increasing involvement of attorneys results in larger settlements than if workers' compen-
sation claims were settled directly between worker and employer. Finally, there has also
been much "social inflation" with arbitrators and members of the Illinois Industrial Com-
mission producing ever more generous awards. See id at 719. Professor Parrish noted
that, on the average, employer workers' compensation costs jumped 357% by late 1977. See
id at 736. The economic effect of the sudden rise in benefits was severe. As Professor
Parrish observed:
Municipalities and school districts [like industry] have faced similar costs
problems and, as a result, have been forced to lay off workers, restrict hiring and
raise taxes.
The position of many Illinois employers has deteriorated rapidly vis-a-vis
competitors in nearby states. The shock waves created by the 1975 amendments
in Illinois workers' compensation law are still continuing. There is evidence that
some employers have already left the state because of the amendments. What is
more disturbing is what the changes hold for the future. The decision to move
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may not, and most likely will not, be covered by employers' workers'
compensation liability insurance.40 If there is coverage, it is doubtful that
it will be sufficient in cases where the tort judgment and workers' com-
pensation liability are both high.41 And whether or not there is adequate
coverage for large awards, the costs of such awards will naturally push up
the employers' insurance costs.
42
The Kordosky decision, like Lambertson, provides incentive to employers
to improve work-site safety.43 While the Kordosky court conceded that it
was not fully content with a loss allocation scheme that exposed employ-
ers to liability in excess of the statutory limit," it implied that its result
was the most equitable among the given options. At the heart of the
Kordosky decision is the policy question of which entity, the employer or
the third-party tortfeasor,45 should pay more than its "fair share" of a
out of state, or to start or not to start a new plant in Illinois takes time. Many
employers now believe that the business climate of Illinois has turned sour. This
could adversely affect employer decisions and, hence, employment opportunities
in the state, unless some modifications are made in Illinois workers' compensa-
tion law.
Workmen's Compensation law in Illinois, as it now stands, is counter-
productive for many middle and small firms. The burden of Worker's Compen-
sation costs is suddenly so great that there are insufficient funds left to make
safety improvements in the work environment.
Id at 736-37 (footnotes omitted).
40. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 94.40; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT VII-92 to 93 (1977).
41. See Steenson, supra note 1, at 304. As Professor Steenson noted, Coverage B is
written in the standard amount of $100,000 per occurrence, an amount less than many
tort judgments. Id at 304 n.232.
42. Id Evidencing the likely increase in claim frequency is a study of closed claims
made by the Insurance Service Office (ISO) which covered 1976 and the early part of
1977. The study included a survey which indicated that in 50.1% of the claims for which
payment was made to employees, the insureds would have impleaded the employer but
for the sole source remedy rule. In terms of dollars of payment, the percentage was 56.3%.
See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABIIrTY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY 64-65
(1977). In those cases where the employer would have been impleaded by the carriers, the
economic loss tended to be greater than in those cases in which there would have been no
impleader. See id at 66.
43. Increased economic incentive to reduce the employee's injury risk is desirable, as
there is evidence that the present system of loss allocation operates to dull employer incen-
tives to keep workplace products safe. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, upra note 42, at
81.
44. See 304 N.W.2d at 621.
45. The third principal in this cast of characters, the employee, has curiously escaped
scrutiny as a possible means through which a balanced result might be effected. A
straightforward method of keeping both third-party tortfeasors and employers happy
would be to require the third party to pay the employee its percentage of comparative
fault and no more, and require the employer to pay its amount of workers' compensation and
no more. This would avoid the need for contribution and impose a just burden of liability
on both the third party and the employer: the third party pays its fair share of the com-
parative fault and the employer satisfies its obligation of automatic but limited liability
under the workers' compensation statute. Of course the "loser" under this method is the
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tort judgment awarded to an injured employee. Despite the limited con-
tribution allowed by Lamberison, third parties still frequently pay dam-
ages substantially in excess of their percentage of fault. Conway Fire &
Safety, Inc., did just this in Kordosky. Employers, on the other hand, may
pay out more than their statutory limit of liability and may even pay out
more than their percentage of comparative fault, depending on the effect
of the 1976 reimbursement amendment. 46 By its express deference to the
legislature in Kordosky, 47 the Minnesota Supreme Court apparently has
withdrawn from any further modification of the law in this area.
employee who in fact has no cause to complain since he receives exactly what he is owed
from the third party and the employer. However, due to the law's strong interest in al-
lowing injured employees the fullest recovery possible, such a straightforward plan is des-
tined to summary burial and the present morass of third-party issues in workers'
compensation law has little hope of drainage.
46. See supra note 24.
47. 304 N.W.2d at 621.
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